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modifications to match recent changes. that's just preparation of more changes towards PBP-Compatibility. Current state is UNSTABLE. See TODO for details whats left to do.
This commit is contained in:
67
man/pcp1.1
67
man/pcp1.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.25 (Pod::Simple 3.16)
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.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.23 (Pod::Simple 3.14)
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.\"
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.\" Standard preamble:
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.\" ========================================================================
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@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
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.\" ========================================================================
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.\"
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.IX Title "PCP1 1"
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.TH PCP1 1 "2014-01-16" "PCP 0.1.5" "USER CONTRIBUTED DOCUMENTATION"
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.TH PCP1 1 "2014-01-19" "PCP 0.1.5" "USER CONTRIBUTED DOCUMENTATION"
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.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
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.if n .ad l
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@@ -332,43 +332,20 @@ Each key can be identified using its \fBkeyid\fR which looks like this:
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.Ve
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.PP
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A public key exported from a secret key will have the same keyid
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as the secret key. When using for encryption, the keyid will be
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added to the message so that the receiver knows who was the
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sender of the message (\fBThis might change in the future. As of
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this writing I'm not sure if this was a good idea\fR).
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as the secret key.
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.PP
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If you just want to know details about a key or the vault, use the
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\&\fB\-t\fR option.
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.SS "Derived Public Keys"
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.IX Subsection "Derived Public Keys"
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In the real world you would not use your primary key to encrypt
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messages, because this would require to send the public key part
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to your recipient in one way or another. The much better and more
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secure way is to use a \fBDerived Public Key\fR:
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.PP
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Such a key will be dynamically generated from a hash of your
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primary secret key and the recipient (an email address, name or key id).
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The public part of this dynamic key will be exported and sent to
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the recipient. A public key generated this way will only be usable
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by the recipient (and yourself) and each recipient will have a different
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public key from you (and vice versa).
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.SH "ENCRYPTION"
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.IX Header "ENCRYPTION"
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There are 3 modi for encryption available in pcp1:
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There are 2 modes of encryption available in pcp1:
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.IP "\fBStandard public key encryption\fR" 4
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.IX Item "Standard public key encryption"
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In this mode, which is the default, a public key as specified
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with \fB\-i\fR and the primary secret key will be used for encryption.
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The public key in question maybe a derived public key, which
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is transparent for the sender however.
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.Sp
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If you don't use derived keys, you will have to transfer
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the public key part of your primary keypair to the recipient,
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which is considered insecure if the transfer channel itself
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uses untrusted transports or if the transferred public key
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ends up on a public system (a shared server, a workstation
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at your employer or the like). You should avoid this encryption
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mode in such cases and use derived keys instead.
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with \fB\-i\fR and a dynamically generated secret key will be used
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for encryption. The public part of the generated sender key
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will be included with the encrypted file, which the recipient
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can use to decrypt it.
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.Sp
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Example command:
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.Sp
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@@ -378,28 +355,6 @@ Example command:
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.Sp
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Here we didn't specify a recipient. Therefore the public
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key given with \-i will be used directly.
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.IP "\fBDerived public key encryption\fR" 4
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.IX Item "Derived public key encryption"
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Derived keys will be generated dynamically at runtime
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(see \fBDerived Public Keys\fR above). Therefore an exported
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derived public key is unique for the sender \s-1AND\s0 recipient.
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.Sp
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This mode can be considered the most secure. If such a key
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gets lost (or into the wrong hands), only this specific
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communication channel will be compromised.
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.Sp
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Example command:
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.Sp
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.Vb 1
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\& pcp1 \-e \-r bobby@local \-I message.txt \-O cipher.z85
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.Ve
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.Sp
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We specified a recipient. pcp1 searches the vault for a
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matching public key and generates a derived keypair for
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encryption. You need to have a public key installed from
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the recipient anyway, it won't work without one. You may
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also specify a key id (\-i) as well to make sure, the right
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key will be used for derivation.
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.IP "\fBSelf encryption mode\fR" 4
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.IX Item "Self encryption mode"
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Pretty Curved Privacy doesn't provide symetric file encryption.
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@@ -577,11 +532,13 @@ Take a look at the function \fB\f(BIpcp_keypairs()\fB\fR for details.
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Encrypted output will always be Z85 encoded and has the following
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format:
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.PP
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.Vb 7
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.Vb 9
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\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+
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\& | Field Size Description |
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\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+
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\& | Hash | 32 | Hash of the sender key id |
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\& | Pubkey | 32 | Publix key of the sender |
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\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-|\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-|\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+
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\& | Nonce | 24 | Random Nonce |
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\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-|\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-|\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+
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\& | Encrypted | ~ | The actual encrypted data |
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\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-|\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-|\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+
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