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975 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
975 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
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=head1 PCP1 KEYS
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B<pcp1> keys are stored in a binary file, called B<the vault>.
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It's by default located in B<~/.pcpvault> but you can of course
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specify another location using the B<-V> option.
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There are two kinds of keys: secret and public keys. In reality
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a secret key always includes its public key. Both types of keys
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can be exported to files and transfered to other people who can
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then import them. You should usually only do this with public keys
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though.
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There is a primary secret key which will always used for operations
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when no keyid has been specified. However, you may have as many
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secret keys in your vault as you like.
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Each key can be identified using its B<keyid> which looks like this:
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0xD49119E85266509F
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A public key exported from a secret key will have the same keyid
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as the secret key.
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If you just want to know details about a key or the vault, use the
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B<-t> option.
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=head1 ENCRYPTION
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There are 3 modes of encryption available in pcp1:
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=over
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=item B<Standard public key encryption>
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In this mode, which is the default, a public key as specified
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with B<-i> or B<-r> and your primary secret key will be used
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for encryption.
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Example command:
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pcp1 -e -i 0x2BD734B15CE2722D -I message.txt -O message.asc
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Here we didn't specify a recipient. Therefore the public
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key given with -i will be used directly.
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Another example:
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pcp1 -e -r Bobby -r McCoy -I message.txt -O message.asc
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As you can see, it is also possible to encrypt a message for multiple
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recipients.
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=item B<Anonymous public key encryption>
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In anonymous mode a random generated keypair will be used on the
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sender side. This way the recipient doesn't have to have your public
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key.
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Example command:
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pcp1 -r -r Bobby -A -I message.txt -O message.asc
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The public key part of the generated key pair will be included in
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the output, which potentiall lessens security. Use with care and
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avoid this mode when possible.
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=item B<Self encryption mode>
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You can also encrypt a file symetrically. No public key material
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will be used in this mode.
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While this works, the security of it totally depends on the
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strength of the passphrase used for encryption.
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Example command:
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pcp1 -e -I message.txt -O cipher.z85
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As you can see we didn't specify any recipients (-i or -r) and therefore pcp1
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operates in self mode encryption. It will ask you for a passphrase, from which
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an encryption key will be derived using scrypt().
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PCP doesn't validate the security of the passphrase.
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Self mode can be explicitly enforced with B<-m>.
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=back
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=head1 SIGNATURES
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There are 3 modes for digital signatures available on pcp1:
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=over
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=item B<Standard NACL binary signatures>
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In this mode, which is the default, an ED25519 signature will
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be calculated from a BLAKE2 hash of the input file content. Both
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the original file content plus the signature will be written to
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the output file.
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Example:
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pcp1 -g -I message.txt -O message.asc -g
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You will be asked for the passphrase to access your primary
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secret key. The output file will be a binary file.
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=item B<Armored NACL signatures>
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While this mode does the very same calculations, the output
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slightly differs. The output file will be marked as a signature
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file, the signature itself will be appended with its own headers
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and Z85 encoded.
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Example:
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pcp1 -g -I message.txt -O message.asc -g -z
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You will be asked for the passphrase to access your primary
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secret key. The output file will be a text file.
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=item B<Detached NACL signatures>
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In some cases you will need to have the signature separated
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from the original input file, e.g. to sign download files. You
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can generate detached signatures for such purposes. Still, the
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signature will be calculated the same way as in standard signatures
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but put out into a separate file. A detached signature file will always
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be Z85 encoded.
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Example:
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pcp1 -g -I message.txt -O -g --sigfile message.sig
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Verification by recipient:
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pcp -c -f message.sig -I message.txt
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=back
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=head1 SIGNED ENCRYPTION
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Beside pure encryption and signatures pcp1 also supports signed
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encryption. In this mode an input file will be encrypted and a
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signature of the encrypted content and encrypted recipients with your primary
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secret key will be appended.
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The signature is encrypted as well.
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Example:
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pcp1 -e -g -r Bobby -I README.txt -O README.asc
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Please note the additional B<-g> parameter. The recipient can
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decrypt and verify the so created data like this:
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pcp1 -d -I README.asc -o README.txt
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If decryption works, the output file will be written. If signature
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verification fails you will be informed, but the decrypted
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output will be left untouched. It is up to you how to react
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on an invalid signature.
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=head1 ALTERNATIVE COMMANDLINES
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You can save typing if you supply additional arguments to
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pcp after commandline options. Such arguments are treated
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as filenames or recipients, depending what options you already
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specified.
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Here is a list of commandlines and their possible alternatives:
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ORIGINAL ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTION
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pcp -e -I message -r Bob pcp -e -r Bob message use 'message' as inputfile.
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pcp -e -I message Bob use 'Bob' as recipient,
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multiple recipients supported.
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pcp -d -I crypted pcp -d crypted use 'crypted' as inputfile.
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pcp -g -I message pcp -g message use 'message' as inputfile.
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pcp -g -I msg -O sig pcp -g -I msg sig use 'sig' as outputfile.
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pcp -p -O key.pcp pcp -p key.pcp use 'key.pcp' as outputfile.
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pcp -p -O key.pcp -r Bob pcp -p -O key.pcp Bob use 'Bob' as recipient.
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pcp -s -O key.pcp pcp -s key.pcp use 'key.pcp' as outputfile.
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pcp -s -O key.pcp -r Bob pcp -s -O key.pcp Bob use 'Bob' as recipient.
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pcp -K -I alice.pcp pcp -K alice.pcp use 'alice.pcp' as keyfile.
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=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
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pcp respects the following environment variables:
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=over
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=item B<PCP_VAULT>
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Use an alternative vaultfile. The default is B<~/.pcpvault> and
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can be overridden with the B<-V> commandline option. If PCP_VAULT
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is set, this one will be used instead.
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=item B<PCP_DEBUG>
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Enable debugging output, where supported. Same as B<-D>.
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=back
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=head1 EXIT STATUS
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Pcp may return one of several error codes if it encounters problems.
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=over
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=item 0 No problems occurred.
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=item 1 Generic error code.
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=back
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=head1 FILES
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=over
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=item B<~/.pcpvault>
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Default vault file where all keys are stored.
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=back
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=head1 EXPERIMENTAL STATUS
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Currently there are a couple of problems which are
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unsolved or in the process to be solved.
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=over
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=item B<No secure native key exchange for store-and-forward systems>
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Pretty Curved Privacy is a store-and-forward system, it works
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on files and can't use any cool key exchange protocols therefore.
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For example there would be B<CurveCP> which guarantees a
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secure key exchange. But CurveCP cannot be used offline.
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Users have to find other means to exchange keys. That's a pity
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since with Curve25519 you can't just publish your public key
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to some key server because in order to encrypt a message, both
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the recipient AND the sender need to have the public key of
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each other. It would be possible to publish public keys,
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and attach the senders public key to the encrypted message, but
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I'm not sure if such an aproach would be secure enough. Pcp
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implements this scheme though (refer to the option -A).
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=item B<Curve25519 not widely adopted>
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At the time of this writing the ECC algorithm Curve25519
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is only rarely used, in most cases by experimental software
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(such as Pretty Curved Privacy). As far as I know there haven't
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been done the kind of exessive crypto analysis as with other
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ECC algorithms.
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While I, as the author of pcp1 totally trust D.J.Bernstein, this
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may not be the case for you.
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=item B<Unreviewed yet>
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As with every crypto software, pcp has to undergo a couple rounds
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of peer review (analysis) in order to be considered secure, trustable
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and stable. No any such review has been undertaken on pcp yet.
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Pcp is a mere fun project aimed at teaching myself better C coding
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and crypto. In fact I don't even trust the software myself and I
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don't use it for anything remotely serious.
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=back
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B<In short: don NOT use this software for production purposes!>
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=head1 INTERNALS
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=head2 PASSPHRASES
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Passphrases are used to protect secret data at rest on various instances
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by pcp, like secret keys or symmetric encrypted data.
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Pcp doesn't use the passphrase directly but uses a key derivation function
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to calculate a secure key from the passphrase: libsodium's
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B<crypto_pwhash_scryptsalsa208sha256()> function.
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In order to properly protect secret keys, pcp measures the entropy
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of a given passphrase and warns the user about the possible weak
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passphrase. This measurement is calculated using the Claude E. Shannon
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method, where a value of 8.0 means maximum available entropy (e.g.
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truly random 256 chars in no comprehensible order) and 0.0 stands
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for the worst like passphrases like "aaa" or "x".
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Pcp considers passphrases with an entropy measurement of 3.32 or higher
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as acceptable. This may change in the future.
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=head2 VAULT FORMAT
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The vault file contains all public and secret keys. It's a portable
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binary file.
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The file starts with a header:
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| Field Size Description |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| File ID | 1 | Vault Identifier 0xC4 |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| Version | 4 | Big endian, version |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| Checksum | 32 | SHA256 Checksum |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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The checksum is a checksum of all keys.
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The header is followed by the keys. Each key is preceded by a
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key header which looks like this:
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+--------------------------------------------+
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| Field Size Description |
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+--------------------------------------------+
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| Type | 1 | Key type (S,P,M) |
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+--------------------------------------------+
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| Size | 4 | Big endian, keysize |
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+--------------------------------------------+
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| Version | 4 | Big endian, keyversion |
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+--------------------------------------------+
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| Checksum | 32 | SHA256 Key Checksum |
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+--------------------------------------------+
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Type can be one of:
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PCP_KEY_TYPE_MAINSECRET 0x01
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PCP_KEY_TYPE_SECRET 0x02
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PCP_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC 0x03
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The key header is followed by the actual key, see below.
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=head2 SECRET KEY FORMAT
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A secret key is a binary structure with the following format:
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+---------------------------------------------------------+
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| Field Size Description |
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+-------------+--------+----------------------------------+
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| Public | 32 | Curve25519 Public Key Part |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Secret | 32 | Curve25519 Secret Key Unencrypted|
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| ED25519 Pub | 32 | ED25519 Public Key Part |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| ED25519 Sec | 64 | ED25519 Secret Key Unencrypted |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Nonce | 24 | Nonce for secret key encryption |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Encrypted | 48 | Encrypted Curve25519 Secret Key |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Owner | 255 | String, Name of Owner |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Mail | 255 | String, Email Address |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| ID | 17 | String, Key ID |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Ctime | 4 | Creation time, sec since epoch |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Version | 4 | Key version |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Serial | 4 | Serial Number |
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+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
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| Type | 1 | Key Type |
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+-------------+--------+----------------------------------+
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Some notes:
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The secret key fields will be filled with random data if the
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key is encrypted. The first byte of it will be set to 0 in that
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case.
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The key id is a computed JEN Hash of the secret and public
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key concatenated, put into hex, as a string.
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The key version is a static value, currently 0x2. If the key
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format changes in the future, this version number will be
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increased to distinguish old from new keys.
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Exported keys will be encoded in Z85 encoding. When such an
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exported key is imported, only the actual Z85 encoded data
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will be used. Header lines and lines starting with whitespace
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will be ignored. They are only there for convenience.
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Key generation works like this:
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=over
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=item *
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Generate a random seed (32 bytes).
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=item *
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Generate a ED25519 sigining keypair from that seed.
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=item *
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Generate a random seed (32 bytes).
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=item *
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Generate a Curve25519 encryption keypair from that seed.
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=back
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So, while both secrets are stored in the same PCP key, they
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are otherwise unrelated. If one of them leaks, the other
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cannot be recalculated from it.
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Take a look at the function B<pcp_keypairs()> for details.
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=head2 PUBLIC KEY EXPORT FORMAT
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Exported public and secret keys will be written in a portable
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way. Pcp uses RFC4880 export format for public keys with some
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slight modifications:
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=over
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=item
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Key material is native to libsodium/pcp and not specified in the
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rfc for curve25519/ed25519. Therefore pcp encodes key material doing it like
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this: mp|sp|cp
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where
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mp = master keysigning public key (ed25519), 32 bytes
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sp = signing public key (ed25519), 32 bytes
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cp = encryption public key (curve25519), 32 bytes
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=item
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The various cipher (algorithm) id's are unspecified for
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libsodium/pcp native ciphers. Therefore they are proprietary to pcp, starting at
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33 (22 is the last officially assigned one). Once
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those cipher numbers become official, they will be used instead.
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=item
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Pcp uses 64 bit integers for timestamps everywhere (ctime, expire, etc),
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to be year 2038 safe. Note, that this is a violation of the
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RFC spec. However, said RFC have to be modified to fit 2038
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(and beyond) anyways. This applies for the keyfile ctime as
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well for the key sig sub fields containing time values.
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=item
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The exported public key packet contains a signature. Pcp is
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filling out all required fields. A signature has a variable
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number of sig sub packets. Pcp uses only these types:
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2 = Signature Creation Time (8 byte)
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3 = Signature Expiration Time (8 byte)
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9 = Key Expiration Time (8 bytes)
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20 = Notation Data (4 byte flags, N bytes name+value)
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27 = Key Flags (1 byte, use 0x02, 0x08 and 0x80
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=item
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Pcp uses 3 notation fields:
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=over
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=item "owner", which contains the owner name, if set
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=item "mail", which contains the emailaddress, if set
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=item "serial", which contains the 32bit serial number
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=back
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=item
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The actual signature field consists of the blake2 hash of
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(mp|sp|cp|keysig) followed by the nacl signature. However, pcp
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does not put an extra 16 byte value of the hash, since the nacl
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signature already contains the full hash. So, an implementation
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could simply pull the fist 16 bytes of said hash to get
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the same result if desired.
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=item
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The mp keypair will be used for signing. The recipient can
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verify the signature, since mp is included.
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=item
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While pcp puts expiration dates for the key and the signature
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into the export as the rfc demands, it mostly ignores them (yet).
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Key expiring is not implemented in PCP yet.
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=item
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We use big-endian always.
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=item
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Unlike RC4880 public key exports, pcp uses Z85 encoding if
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armoring have been requested by the user. Armored output has
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a header and a footer line, however they are ignored by the
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parser and are therefore optional. Newlines, if present, are
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optional as well.
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http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3
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=item
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The key sig blob will be saved in the Vault unaltered during
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import, so pcp is able to verify the signature at will anytime. When exporting
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a foreign public key, pcp just puts out that key sig blob to the
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export untouched.
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=item
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Currently PCP only supports self-signed public key exports.
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=item
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Pcp only supports one key signature per key. However, it would be easily
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possible to support foreign keysigs as well in the future.
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=back
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So, a full pubkey export looks like this
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version
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ctime
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cipher
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3 x raw keys \
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sigheader > calculate hash from this
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sigsubs (header+data) /
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hash
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signature
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=head2 SECRET KEY EXPORT FORMAT
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Secret keys are exported in a proprietary format.
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The exported binary blob is symmetrically encrypted using the NACL
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function crypto_secret(). The passphrase will be used to derive an
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encryption key using the STAR function scrypt().
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The binary data before encryption consists of:
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ED25519 master signing secret
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Curve25519 encryption secret
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ED25519 signing secret
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ED25519 master signing public
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Curve25519 encryption public
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ED25519 signing public
|
|
Optional notations, currently supported are the 'owner' and 'mail' attributes.
|
|
If an attribute is empty, the len field is zero.
|
|
-# len(VAL) (2 byte uint)
|
|
-# VAL (string without trailing zero)
|
|
8 byte creation time (epoch)
|
|
4 byte key version
|
|
4 byte serial number
|
|
|
|
The encrypted cipher will be prepended with the random nonce used
|
|
to encrypt the data and looks after encryption as such:
|
|
|
|
Nonce | Cipher
|
|
|
|
=head2 ENCRYPTED OUTPUT FORMAT
|
|
|
|
The encryption protocol used by PCP uses mostly standard
|
|
libsodium facilities with the exception that PCP uses counter
|
|
mode (CTR-Mode) for stream encryption.
|
|
|
|
Detailed description:
|
|
|
|
=over
|
|
|
|
=item generate a random ephemeral 32 byte key B<S>
|
|
|
|
=item encrypt it asymetrically for each recipient using a unique nonce (B<R>)
|
|
|
|
=item encrypt the input file 32k blockwise using the ephemeral key
|
|
|
|
=over
|
|
|
|
=item for each input block with a size of 32k bytes:
|
|
|
|
=item generate a random nonce B<N>
|
|
|
|
=item put the current counter size into the first byte of the nonce
|
|
|
|
=item put the current counter (starting with 1) into the following byte(s), if larger than 1 byte, in big endian mode
|
|
|
|
=item encrypt the 32k block using B<crypto_secretbox()> with the nonce B<N> and the ephemeral key B<S>
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
Symetric encryption works the very same without the recipient stuff.
|
|
|
|
Formal format description, asymetric encrypted files:
|
|
|
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
| Field Size Description |
|
|
+-------------+--------+------------------------------------+
|
|
| Type | 1 | Filetype, 5=ASYM, 23=SYM, 6=ANON |
|
|
+-------------|--------|------------------------------------+
|
|
| Anon PUB * | 32 | anon pubkey, only used with type 6 |
|
|
+-------------|--------|------------------------------------+
|
|
| Len R * | 4 | Number of recipients (*) |
|
|
+-------------|--------|------------------------------------+
|
|
| Recipients *| R*72 | C(recipient)|C(recipient)... (*) |
|
|
+-------------|--------|------------------------------------+
|
|
| Encrypted | ~ | The actual encrypted data |
|
|
+-------------|--------|------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
*) not included when doing symetric encryption.
|
|
|
|
Recipient field format:
|
|
|
|
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
| Field Size Description |
|
|
+-------------+--------+----------------------------------+
|
|
| Nonce | 24 | Random Nonce, one per R |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Cipher | 48 | S encrypted with PK or R |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
R is generated using B<crypto_box()> with the senders
|
|
secret key, the recipients public key and a random nonce.
|
|
|
|
Pseudocode:
|
|
|
|
R = foreach P: N | crypto_box(S, N, P, SK)
|
|
L = len(R)
|
|
T = 5
|
|
write (T | L | R)
|
|
foreach I: write (N | crypto_secret_box(I, N, S))
|
|
|
|
where P is the public key of a recipient, SK is the senders
|
|
secret key, R is the recipient list, L is the number of recipients,
|
|
T is the filetype header, I is a block of input with a size
|
|
of 32k, N is a nonce (new per block) and S the symmetric key.
|
|
|
|
If using anonymous encryption, the sender generates a ephemeral
|
|
key pair, uses the secret part of it to generate R. The public
|
|
part will be included with the output (right after the file type.
|
|
In this mode a recipient is not required to have the public key
|
|
of the sender.
|
|
|
|
The encrypted output maybe Z85 encoded. In this case the Z85
|
|
encoding will be done blockwise with blocks of 16k bytes. The
|
|
decoded content inside will be as described above.
|
|
|
|
=head2 SIGNATURE FORMAT
|
|
|
|
There are different signature formats. Standard binary NACL
|
|
signatures have the following format:
|
|
|
|
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
| Field Size Description |
|
|
+-------------+--------+----------------------------------+
|
|
| Content | ~ | Original file content |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| \nnacl- | 6 | Offset separator |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Hash | 64 | BLAKE2 hash of the content |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Signature | 64 | ED25519 signature of BLAKE2 Hash |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
The actual signature is not a signature over the whole content
|
|
of an input file but of a BLAKE2 hash of the content.
|
|
|
|
Pseudo code:
|
|
|
|
H = crypto_generichash(C)
|
|
C | O | H | crypto_sign(H, S)
|
|
|
|
where C is the message (content), H is the blake2 hash,
|
|
O is the offset separator and S is the secret signing key
|
|
of the sender.
|
|
|
|
Armored signatures have the following format:
|
|
|
|
----- BEGIN ED25519 SIGNED MESSAGE -----
|
|
Hash: Blake2
|
|
|
|
MESSAGE
|
|
|
|
----- BEGIN ED25519 SIGNATURE -----
|
|
Version: PCP v0.2.0
|
|
|
|
195j%-^/G[cVo4dSk7hU@D>NT-1rBJ]VbJ678H4I!%@-)bzi>zOba5$KSgz7b@R]A0!kL$m
|
|
MTQ-1DW(e1mma(<jH=QGA(VudgAMXaKF5AGo65Zx7-5fuMZt&:6IL:n2N{KMto*KQ$:J+]d
|
|
dp1{3}Ju*M&+Vk7=:a=J0}B
|
|
------ END ED25519 SIGNATURE ------
|
|
|
|
The Z85 encoded signature at the end contains the same signature
|
|
contents as the binary signature outlined above (hash+sig).
|
|
|
|
=head2 SIGNED ENCRYPTION FORMAT
|
|
|
|
Signed encrypted files are in binary form only. The first part is
|
|
the standard encrypted file as described in B<ENCRYPTED OUTPUT FORMAT>
|
|
followed by the binary encrypted signature described in B<SIGNATURE FORMAT>
|
|
without the offset separator.
|
|
|
|
However, not only the hash of the file content will be signed but the
|
|
recipient list described in B<ENCRYPTED OUTPUT FORMAT> as well. A
|
|
valid recipient is therefore not able to re-encrypt the decrypted
|
|
message, append the original signature and send it to other recipients.
|
|
The signature would not match since the recipient list differs and
|
|
so recipients know that the signature is forged.
|
|
|
|
Formal file description of sign+encrypt format:
|
|
|
|
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
| Field Size Description |
|
|
+-------------+--------+----------------------------------+
|
|
| Type | 1 | Filetype, 5=ASYM, 23=SYM |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Len R | 4 | Number of recipients (*) |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Recipients | R*72 | C(recipient)|C(recipient)... (*) |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Encrypted | ~ | The actual encrypted data |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Signature | ~ | Encrypted signature(*) |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
As usual the encrypted signature consists of a nonce and the
|
|
actual cipher, which is computed symmetrically (see above)
|
|
from the following clear signature.
|
|
|
|
Before encryption the signature format is:
|
|
|
|
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
| Field Size Description |
|
|
+-------------+--------+----------------------------------+
|
|
| Hash | 64 | BLAKE2 hash of content+R (*) |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
| Signature | 64 | ED25519 signature of BLAKE2 Hash |
|
|
+-------------|--------|----------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
where R is: C(recipient)|C(recipient)... (see B<ENCRYPTED OUTPUT FORMAT>).
|
|
|
|
Pseudocode:
|
|
|
|
N | crypto_secret_box( crypto_sign( crypto_generichash( M + R, SK ) ), N, S)
|
|
|
|
where N is the nonce, M the message, R the recipient list, SK is the senders
|
|
secret signing key and S the symmetric key.
|
|
|
|
=head2 Z85 ENCODING
|
|
|
|
B<pcp1> uses Z85 to encode binary data (if requested with -z) such
|
|
as encrypted data, exported keys or armored signatures.
|
|
|
|
Encoded data is always enclosed by a header and a footer and may have any number
|
|
of comments. Example:
|
|
|
|
----- PCP ENCRYPTED FILE -----
|
|
Version: PCP 0.2.1
|
|
246ge]+yn={<I&&Z%(pm[09lc5[dx4TZALi/6cjVe)Kx5S}7>}]Xi3*N3Xx34Y^0rz:r.5j
|
|
v#6Sh/m3XKwy?VlA+h8ks]9:kVj{D[fd7]NA]T-(ne+xo!W5X5-gIUWqM
|
|
----- END PCP ENCRYPTED FILE -----
|
|
|
|
However, the parser tries to be as tolerant as possible. It also accepts
|
|
Z85 encoded data without headers or without newlines, empty lines or lines
|
|
containing a space are ignored as well as comments. Empty comments are not
|
|
allowed.
|
|
|
|
=head3 Z85 PADDING
|
|
|
|
PCP uses a custom padding scheme. Z85 input data size must be a multiple
|
|
of 4. To fulfill this requirement, PCP padds the input with zeros as
|
|
neccessary. To tell the decoder if padding took place and how much zeros
|
|
have been added, PCP adds another 4 bytes after each Z85 encoded block,
|
|
from the last one which contains the number of zeros used for padding,
|
|
even if the input hasn't been padded.
|
|
|
|
=head3 Z85 BACKGROUND
|
|
|
|
The Z85 encoding format is described here: B<http://rfc.zeromq.org/spec:32>.
|
|
It's part of ZeroMQ (B<http://zeromq.org>). Z85 is based on ASCII85 with
|
|
a couple of modifications (portability, readability etc).
|
|
|
|
To fulfil the requirements of the ZeroMQ Z85 functions, B<pcp1>
|
|
does some additional preparations of raw input before actually doing the
|
|
encoding, since the input for zmq_z85_encode() must be divisible by 4. Therefore
|
|
we pad the input with zeroes and remove them after decoding.
|
|
|
|
B<Trying to use another tool to decode an Z85 encoded string produced
|
|
by z85, might not work therefore, unless the tool takes the padding scheme
|
|
outlined above into account>.
|
|
|
|
Z85 encoding and decoding can be used separately as well to work with
|
|
files. Examples:
|
|
|
|
Encode some file to Z85 encoding:
|
|
|
|
pcp1 -z -I file -O file.z85
|
|
|
|
Reverse the process:
|
|
|
|
pcp1 -Z -I file.z85 -O file
|
|
|
|
=head2 PBP COMPATIBILITY
|
|
|
|
PCP tries to be fully compatible with PBP (https://github.com/stef/pbp). Encrypted
|
|
files and signatures - at least their binary versions - should be exchangable. However,
|
|
this is a work in progress and might not work under all circumstances. Also there's currently
|
|
no shared key format between pbp and pcp. However, it is possible to export and
|
|
import pbp keys from/to pcp.
|
|
|
|
=head1 JSON ENCODING SUPPORT
|
|
|
|
If pcp have been compiled with B<--with-json> (which requires the libjansson
|
|
library), then it supports JSON objects as input and output with the following
|
|
functions:
|
|
|
|
=over
|
|
|
|
=item public key export
|
|
|
|
=item secret key export
|
|
|
|
=item whole vault export
|
|
|
|
=item public key import
|
|
|
|
=item secret key import
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
JSON support can be used either with the commandline tool B<pcp1> or programmatically
|
|
using the C, C++ or Python API.
|
|
|
|
=head2 USING JSON FROM THE C API
|
|
|
|
In order to use JSON all you've got to do is to switch a context flag:
|
|
|
|
PCPCTX *ptx = ptx_new();
|
|
ptx->json = 1;
|
|
|
|
That all to it. Now any function normally used for key import and export works
|
|
with JSON, just fill the B<Buffer> object with a JSON string for imports or
|
|
fetch the Buffer content of an export function as a string.
|
|
|
|
=head2 USING JSON FROM THE COMMANDLINE
|
|
|
|
In order to use JSON on the commandline, add B<-j>. This can be used in
|
|
conjunction with the following options:
|
|
|
|
=over
|
|
|
|
=item B<-p>
|
|
|
|
Public key export.
|
|
|
|
=item B<-s>
|
|
|
|
Secret key export.
|
|
|
|
=item B<-K>
|
|
|
|
Public and secret key import.
|
|
|
|
=item B<-t>
|
|
|
|
Text view mode (aka inspect mode).
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
The B<-z> and B<-Z> options are ignored in JSON mode.
|
|
|
|
=head2 JSON OBJECT STRUCTURE
|
|
|
|
=head3 JSON PUBLIC KEY (pcp1 -p -j)
|
|
|
|
The JSON object for a public key looks like this:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
"id": "6BF2980419E0986A",
|
|
"owner": "tom",
|
|
"mail": "tom@local",
|
|
"ctime": 1436170865,
|
|
"expire": 1467706865,
|
|
"version": 6,
|
|
"serial": 1509801135,
|
|
"type": "public",
|
|
"cipher": "CURVE25519-ED25519-POLY1305-SALSA20",
|
|
"cryptpub": "0fdf0f7269f901b7f0fba989a1fddbf576c7cc148a2e5987fdeea3523978fe01",
|
|
"sigpub": "6980b76e17170194626b49cbab1ab35369a0635f52fe1a7cf39cc5421fb5c0c2",
|
|
"masterpub": "947a49f29e9cb0e92b61e2a1dea95f8ec81a24baed78e85c1b52cc3714f5e45e",
|
|
"signature": "947a49f29e9cb0e92b61e2a1dea95f8ec81a24baed78e85c1b52cc3714f5e45[..]"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Actually the field B<signature> contains the whole encoded public key.
|
|
|
|
Fields containing byte arrays are hex encoded.
|
|
|
|
Numbers are represented as literal integers.
|
|
|
|
=head3 JSON SECRET KEY (pcp1 -s -j)
|
|
|
|
The JSON object for a public key looks like this:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
"id": "6BF2980419E0986A",
|
|
"owner": "tom",
|
|
"mail": "tom@local",
|
|
"ctime": 1436170865,
|
|
"expire": 1467706865,
|
|
"version": 6,
|
|
"serial": 1509801135,
|
|
"type": "secret",
|
|
"cipher": "CURVE25519-ED25519-POLY1305-SALSA20",
|
|
"cryptpub": "0fdf0f7269f901b7f0fba989a1fddbf576c7cc148a2e5987fdeea3523978fe01",
|
|
"sigpub": "6980b76e17170194626b49cbab1ab35369a0635f52fe1a7cf39cc5421fb5c0c2",
|
|
"masterpub": "947a49f29e9cb0e92b61e2a1dea95f8ec81a24baed78e85c1b52cc3714f5e45e",
|
|
"secrets": "ad5ce150f3cd7bffa299d4db5bf3d26ae56c3808ccba7[..]",
|
|
"nonce": "858ef9870fc8f39903cfb281d697ca29a935d2ae929fa4ea"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
As you can see that's pretty identical to a public key json object beside the
|
|
B<secrets> and B<nonce> fields. The B<secrets> field contains the encrypted
|
|
secret key material. Pcp does not support exporting a secret key unencrypted.
|
|
|
|
The B<nonce> is required for a later import and shall not be changed or
|
|
decoupled from B<secrets>. This may change in the future.
|
|
|
|
=head3 JSON VAULT (pcp1 -t)
|
|
|
|
The JSON object for the vault looks like this:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
"keyvaultfile": "/home/tom/.pcpvault",
|
|
"version": 2,
|
|
"checksum": "27b583dc2dacf5ccc874b7be3a39748d107c6b9e9f9d473f1c716a94561ef793",
|
|
"secretkeys": 1,
|
|
"publickey": 3,
|
|
"keys": []
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
The field B<keys> is an array containing one or more of the already
|
|
described key objects.
|
|
|
|
=head3 JSON PROGRAM OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
Currently pcp does not support JSON program output, that is, success or
|
|
error messages on STDERR are not encoded as json. This may change in the future.
|
|
|
|
|